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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
be removed, however, by future Supreme Court decisions which
define the requirements of the fourth amendment more clearly,
and the gap between the federal and the Louisiana standards
will narrow considerably.
A. L. Wright II
CAUSE TO SEARCH AND SEIZE
Crime investigators often face the problem of whether to
search the property or person of a suspect. If a search is im-
proper for want of sufficient cause, then all that it uncovers
must be excluded from any subsequent prosecution. Thus a police
blunder may not only render a fruitful search futile, but may
also cloak the criminal with immunity. Unfortunately, it is im-
possible to arm the police with a criterion which will unfailingly
answer the question: "Are the facts sufficient to support a
search or seizure?" This Comment is an attempt to analyze the
factors which the courts have weighed in evaluating police re-
sponses to this question.
I. THE FEDERAL CASES
The federal powers of search and seizure are limited by the
fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.' Analyti-
cally, this amendment is severable into two clauses. The first
requires that all searches and seizures be reasonable and the
second prohibits the issuance of search warrants without a show-
ing of probable cause. The test of reasonableness set forth in
the first clause is two-fold: (1) there must be reasonable
grounds 2 to justify the intrusion and (2) the search or seizure
must be executed in a reasonable manner.3 Where the search or
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and Particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
2. The reasonable cause test, implicit in the first clause of the fourth
amendment, must be distinguished from the "reasonable grounds" and "reason-
able cause" language frequently used in legislation creating police arrest powers.
Such language is equivalent to the fourth amendment's requirement that arrests
may be made only upon probable cause. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471, 478 n.6 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100 (1959).
3. Reasonableness of execution includes such considerations as the intensity,
object, area, duration, and violence of the search. See Harris v. United States,
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seizure is authorized by warrant the test of reasonable grounds
to search accedes to the magistrate's finding of probable cause.
Nevertheless, the magistrate's sanction is more than a certifica-
tion that probable cause exists.4 The interposition of an inde-
pendent evaluator between the police and the people is a check
on the executive branch of government and springs from the
separation of powers between the executive, judiciary, and legis-
lature.5 It is not surprising, therefore, that the courts have
resisted police encroachment by making the validation of a war-
rantless search or seizure more onerous than the probable cause
test, for obtaining a warrant.
The Supreme Court has treated the distinction between the
demands for validation of a search under warrant and a war-
rantless search in terms of presumption, proof, and preference.
There is a presumption that the magistrate had probable cause
for issuing a warrant. This presumption rests in part on the
deference with which superior tribunals treat findings of fact
by inferior judicial officers. Although the Supreme Court has
only referred to the standard of review as "sabstantial defer-
ence," 6 the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
accept determinations of the magistrate "unless it is shown that
the Commissioner's judgment was arbitrarily exercised."7 The
Second Circuit has held that in close cases "the very fact that
the Commissioner found probable cause is itself a substantial
factor tending to uphold the validity of the warrant he issued. '"8
Both these tests differ from that applied by appellate courts to
the findings of the trial judge on a motion to suppress evidence
obtained through an improper search. The conclusions of the
trial judge are accepted unless they are found to be "clearly
erroneous."9 While it is clear that the burden is on a defendant
331 U.S. 145, 152 (1946); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344, 357 (1931); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886).
4. See Burt v. Smith, 203 U.S. 129, 134 (1906).
5. In fact, the fourth amendment is rooted in the struggle between the
British Crown and Parliament over the power of the King's Ministers to
search and seize independently of the legislative and judicial branches of gov-
ernment. For a history of the amendment and its origins, see Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 724-29 (1961) ; Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360,
363-66 (1959).
6. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964).
7. United States v. Plemmons, 336 F.2d 731, 733 (6th Cir. 1964). See also
United States v. Haskins, 345 F.2d 111 (6th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Malu-
gin, 296 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1961) ; Castle v. United States, 287 F.2d 657 (5th
Cir. 1961).
8. United States v. Ramirez, 279 F.2d 712, 716 (2d Cir. 1960).
9. United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962).
1966]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
who seeks to suppress evidence obtained under a search warrant
to show the want of probable cause,' 0 the Supreme Court has
not been faced with the question of who had the burden of proof
where the defendant seeks to suppress the fruits of a warrantless
search. In such a case it seems certain11 that the lower .court
practice of placing the burden on the prosecution 12 would be
continued.
The Court in Johnson v. United States'3 warned that "any
assumption that evidence sufficient to support ... A search war-
rant will support a search without a warrant would reduce the
[Fourth] Amendment to a nullity." This distinction in standards
of proof may be limited to the factual situation of Johnson, a
breach of the security of a dwelling. The reasonableness-of-exe-
cution test protects dwellings, except possibly in exigent circum-
stances, 14 from warrantless invasion no matter how conclusive
the evidence that a search will be fruitful. This protection is
antecedent to the fourth amendment. "An Englishman's home,
though a hovel, is his castle, precisely because the law secures
freedom from fear of intrusion by the people except under
carefully safeguarded authorization by a magistrate."' 5 It seems
more likely that the distinction in Johnson was meant to have a
broader application than that merely of a safeguard for an
interest already adequately protected by the requirement of
reasonableness.
The Court in United States v. Lefkowitz 6 stated that "the
informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates" are
favored "over the hurried action of officers and others who hap-
pen to make arrests." There was no explanation of the effects
of this preference, but it is possible that they may not be limited
to proof and presumption. For example, on a question of whether
a search was conducted in a reasonable manner the courts might
10. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960).
11. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
12. See, e.g., Batten v. United States, 188 F.2d 75, 77 (5th Cir. 1951).
13. 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). See also Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
14. For example, a burning dwelling which the police have reasonable
grounds to search might not ,be protected. Cf. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963); United States v. Hall, 348 F.2d 837, 841 (2d Cir. 1965).
15. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1947). For a collection
of cases holding that reasonable grounds is not ordinarily sufficient under
the reasonableness test to support the search of a home without a warrant
see Ford v. United States, 352 F.2d 927, 929-33 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
16. 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
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be more lenient with policemen who were wise enough to obtain
a warrant before they acted.
Warrantless Searches and Seizures
To decide whether it was reasonable to execute a warrant-
less search the courts must weigh (1) the sufficiency of cause,
(2) the value of the interest invaded, and (3) the circumstances
surrounding the search. Although it is difficult to isolate these
factors, apparently any interest protected by the fourth amend-
ment will, under normal circumstances, prevail over such causes
as the odors of fermenting mash' and alcohol,' 8 the fumes of
burning opium,' 9 the sound of adding machines at the location
of a suspected "numbers game, '20 and the installation of an
unusual number of phones at a suspected book-making operation
headquarters.2'1
By way of dictum in United States v. Ventresca2 2 the Su-
preme Court named as interests that may be invaded without
warrants, even when there exists reasonable cause, the privacy
of a moving object and the security of property under the control
of an arrestee.2 3 Presumably the Court, even if it classifies all
but two fourth amendment interests as inviolate, will still recog-
nize "exceptional circumstances" which override even the more
favored interests. This approach deprives the courts of the
flexibility inherent in the gradation of interests and forces an
undue emphasis on circumstances surrounding the search. The
privacy of a person's bedroom is more worthy of protection than
the privacy of a house of prostitution. The courts have, in fact,
made distinctions between the interests lumped together in
Ventresca. The security of the home has been spoken of as a
17. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932).
18. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
19. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
20. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1949).
21. United States v. Nicholson, 303 F.2d 330 (6th Cir. 1962).
22. 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
23. It is interesting to note that the first clause of the fourth amendment
protects "persons, houses, papers, and effects" from unreasonable searches, whereas
the second clause concerning the issuance of warrants refers to "the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Unless we are to consider
a person as a place, this syntax would seem to leave the search of persons out-
side the ambit of search warrants. In fact, search warrants have seldom been
used for the search of persons; nevertheless, they can be issued (United States
v. Stoffey, 279 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1960)), and where the person to be searched
is believed to be innocently carrying some instrumentality, fruit, or contraband
of another's crime, a search warrant is the only proper way to proceed in the
absence of consent.
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paramount right.2 4 It has been urged that the same right ex-
tends to a hotel room ;25 but "the law does not prohibit every
entry, without a warrant, into a hotel room. ' 2 Because of the
contract between hotel and guest, circumstances might arise
where an inquiry by a house detective who is also a deputy
sheriff would be reasonable, while similar circumstances would
not justify the invasion of a home. The fourth amendment pro-
tects places of business, but the courts are inclined to use a less
demanding test of reasonableness.
27
The circumstances surrounding the search which should be
considered include the danger of violence and the possibility of
imminent destruction, removal, or concealment of the property
intended for seizure. 28 The courts occasionally refer to the feasi-
bility29 of obtaining a warrant as a separate factor. It would
seem, however, that feasibility is the broad term which encom-
passes danger of violence, destruction, removal, and concealment.
Cases concerning violence contemporaneous with the police ac-
tivity have been in the area of arrest. Nevertheless, there is
some indication that the probability of violence may affect the
reasonableness of a warrantless search. 30 It seems unlikely that
the courts would hobble a search for a time bomb or a typhoid
carrier by insisting upon a warrant. The weight the courts
should give to emergency situations is not clear. In Jones v.
United States, the Supreme Court stated that investigating of-
ficers might be able to dispense with a warrant where there was
"clearly convincing evidence of the immediate need to search."' 3 1
The meaning of "immediate need" was clouded by the subse-
quent case of Ker v. California32 The police in Ker had observed
the defendant meeting a suspected marijuana peddler. Later
24. See District of Columbia v. ,Little, 339 U.S. 1 (1951) ; Smith v. United
States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
25. See Eng Fung Jem v. United States, 281 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1960).
26. United States v. Jerrers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
27. For example, the courts are less willing to find coercion when the
government claims consent to the search. Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582
(1946).
28. United States v. Jerrers, 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951).
29. In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) the Court suggested
that where it is practical to obtain a search warrant there cannot be a valid
warrantless search. This decision was limited to the facts of Trupiano, where
the opeation of an illegal still had been under observation for several months
before the raid. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
30. See the dissenting 6pinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949).
31. 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960).
32. 374 U.S. 23 (1962).
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they realized an informant had previously reported that Ker was
selling narcotics in his apartment. A search was made without
a warrant and marijuana found. The Court split four to four
on whether the conduct of the police violated the fourth amend-
ment. Justice Harlan, in accord with his dissent in Mapp v.
Ohio,33 concurred in validating the search but found the fourth
amendment inapplicable to the states. The prevailing opinion,
by Justice Clark, justified the search by finding time to be
"clearly of the essence." Presumably, under the standard ap-
plied by Justice Clark, police officers may find immediate need
from the ease with which narcotics may be disposed of and the
likelihood that they will be removed. 4 Even if this interpreta-
tion of the Constitution is supported by a majority of the Jus-
tices, federal officers might be held to a stricter standard
through the Court's supervisory powers.
Another variation of feasibility may have been created in
Frank v. Maryland.35 Frank was fined twenty dollars for re-
fusing to permit a Baltimore health inspector to enter his home
in search of rodents. In the course of upholding the fine, the
Court, speaking through Justice Frankfurter, pointed to the
"thousands upon thousands" of inspections made under ordi-
nances designed to eliminate health hazards, a strong implica-
tion that the decision was influenced by the fact that public
health would suffer if inspectors had to spend most of their
time in court. Nevertheless, the Constitution contradicts the
conditional statement that if an application of the fourth amend-
ment's warrant provisions renders a law unenforceable, this will
be a factor in determining whether they will be applied. The
feasibility of enforcement factor raised by Frank must be
limited to the facts of the case. Neglect of public health can lead
to consequences analogous to "the danger of violence." As the
Court observed in Carroll v. United States, "the fourth amend-
ment is to be construed . . . in a manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual
citizens."3 6
33. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
34. Ker has been invoked by prosecutors as a special rule for contraband
crimes where the necessity of proving possession coupled with the ease of destruc-
tion makes it difficult to obtain convictions without warrantless searches. This
interpretation of Ker seems strained unless the investigators know that the sus-
pects have the drugs. See, e.g., Brief of the State, State v. McIlvanie, 245 La.
649, 160 So. 2d 566 (1964).
35. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
36. 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
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The difficulty of untangling the factors of sufficiency of
cause, the value of the interest invaded, and the circumstances
surrounding the search is amply illustrated by the "moving ve-
hicle cases." As noted in Ventresca the search of a moving
vehicle is judged by a special standard. In Brinegar v. United
States8 7 the Supreme Court validated a search of an automobile
being driven by a suspected liquor-runner on a highway known
to be often used by liquor-runners. The investigators' suspicions
were based on the driver's reputation and previous police ex-
periences. This decision appeared to be authority for the proposi-
tion that a less rigorous standard of reasonable cause would
justify the search of a vehicle. If this was the proper interpre-
tation of Brinegar, it was overruled by Rios v. United States8"
and Henry v. United States.3 9 A taxi in a neighborhood known
for "narcotics activity" was the subject of a warrantless search
in Rios. The investigating officers knew that taxicabs were
frequently used as "drop zones" by dealers and addicts. When
the officers noticed a suspicious-looking person getting into a
taxi, they searched it. The Court excluded evidence obtained by
such a search. A search for stolen whisky which revealed stolen
radios was invalidated in Henry. The Government unsuccess-
fully tried to establish reasonable grounds for the search in the
suspicion that Henry was involved in a whisky theft and on his
"guilty behavior" when confronted by the agents. These cases
seem to restrict those who would search vehicles to the same
types of proof that may be used to demonstrate reasonable cause
for other classes of warrantless search.
A special dispensation in the case of moving vehicles would
seem to rest on the circumstance of mobility. A suspect might
easily cross jurisdictional boundaries before the officers could
present their case to a magistrate. The earliest case to distin-
guish the rule for vehicles may have been based in part on an
evaluation of the interest protected. The suspected violation in-
volved the transportation of contraband across the Canadian
border.40 The Court noted that customs seizures are unique in
that personal privacy has historically been subjected to the right
of governments to control access to their lands.41 Although the
37. 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
38. 364 U.S. 253 (1960).
39. 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
40. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
41. See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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Court has applied the rule to facts not associated with smuggling,
this consideration may have well assisted in creating the ex-
ception.
Searches and Seizures Under Warrant
Investigating officers seeking a search warrant must estab-
lish probable cause for the search to the satisfaction of the
issuant.42 The authority to determine whether there is probable
cause may not be delegated to the applicant. Such delegation
would, in fact, be the kind of general warrant that precipitated
the fourth amendment.
The federal statutes do not define "probable cause" and there-
fore a great deal of discretion is given the issuing magistrates.
Although their determinations are subject to review, higher
courts treat them with "substantial deference. '43 The limits of
the magistrate's discretion are determined by (1) the type of
facts which he may consider, (2) the inferences he is permitted
to draw from these facts, and (3) the probability that these
inferences are true.
The facts which a magistrate may consider need not be evi-
dence which would be admissible at a trial. A search warrant,
for example, may be issued on the basis of hearsay. Neverthe-
less, the Supreme Court has gradually restricted the use of hear-
say. In Draper v. United States44 the Court held that the ap-
plicant must provide information as to the reliability of the
informer. The Court in Jones v. United States45 demanded that
the issuant be provided with the factual basis for the inform-
ant's beliefs. Both the reliability of the informer and the basis
for his beliefs relate to the credibility of his information. To al-
low the applicant to determine the credibility of the information
would be an impermissible delegation of authority. Mere con-
clusions as to reliability such as "reliable information from a
credible person" can be given no effect.40 It is not certain, how-
ever, what effect should be given to "previously reliable in-
former," "informer of proven reliability," and "informer who
has given accurate information in the past." All of these state-
ments could describe informers who have mixed inaccuracy and
42. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
43. See note 6 supra.
44. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
45. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
46. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
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truth. It would not be surprising if the Court eventually re-
quired more specification.
There is no requirement that the identity of the informer be
revealed; but anonymity has been effectively jeopardized by
the necessity of revealing the factual basis for the informer's
belief.47 The basis for the informer's belief will presumably be
judged by the same standards that the magistrate would use to
determine probable cause. There would seem to be no reason,
therefore, why hearsay coupled with hearsay might not be con-
sidered by the issuant, provided that there was a demonstration
of credibility for both sources of information.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court stated by way of
dictum in Grau v. United States that "a search warrant may
issue only upon evidence which would be competent in the trial
of the offense before a jury. ' 48 As has been seen, this statement
did not make the rules of evidence applicable to hearings for the
issuance of search warrants. 49 Nevertheless, the courts might
apply the rules selectively. For example, may a search warrant
be validly issued on the basis of information obtained through
the violation of a privileged communication? The relationships
which are protected by privileges could be as adversely affected
by disclosures which result in a search as by testimony in court.
Such a breach of confidence does not involve direct govern-
mental action, however, and would appear to be beyond the scope
of the fourth amendment. 50
Exclusionary rules derived from the Constitution should be
applied to the facts which a magistrate may consider. A search
warrant may not be granted on the basis of evidence gained by
an invalid search. 1 This prohibition may well have broader
effects than the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine set forth
by Justice Holmes in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.
5 2
Silverthorne prevents the indirect use of evidence acquired in
47. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957) held that where an in-
former's testimony might be relevant to the guilt of the accused, his identty
must 'be disclosed. The informer's identity, however, need not be disclosed at
the time of application.
48. 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932).
49. The Grau dictum is weakened by the cases the Court cited as authority.
Neither Wagner v. United States, 284 Fed. 208 (1st Cir. 1922) added the re-
quirement "before a jury." Both decisions were based on other points.
50. Cf. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
51. McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955).
52. 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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contravention of the fourth amendment, provided that the con-
nection between the illegal evidence and its use has not become
"so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. '5 3 If evidence of a dif-
ferent crime is uncovered by a search under a tainted warrant,
the prosecution might argue that the taint is only indirectly
connected with the discovery. The purpose of the Silverthorne
rule is to remove the incentive for violating the fourth amend-
ment. By definition, evidence of unsuspected crime could not
motivate a search antecedent to its discovery. Even if the court
limited Silverthorne, the search warrant would be struck down
by the rule which prohibits the magistrate from considering evi-
dence from an invalid search.
Although there are no cases in point, it seems unlikely that
a magistrate will be allowed to consider evidence resulting from
an unconstitutional arrest. The Silverthorne rule has been ex-
tended by Wong Sun v. United States5 4 to statements made by
persons invalidly arrested and searched. There is no apparent
reason why arrests should be treated differently from searches
in this regard.
There is some doubt whether the fruits of "involuntary" con-
fessions are condemned under the "poisonous tree" doctrine. 5
Even if the courts eventually hold that such a doctrine is ap-
plicable, it should be noted that the interest fostered stems from
the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments. The taint might
exclude some of the evidence uncovered, but it would not neces-
sarily invalidate the search.
The inferences which magistrates are permitted to make are
those "which reasonable men draw from the evidence." 5 Although
it is occasionally said that "an inference on an inference" will
not be allowed,57 such a statement should be limited to unsup-
ported conclusions offered by the applicant. There would seem
to be no justification for depriving the magistrate of the benefit
of the applicant's experience and training. Where the applicant
provides the magistrate with the facts upon which his conclu-
sions are based and the reasoning behind his conclusions, the
issuant should be allowed to infer that an expert's inferences
53. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
54. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
55. See Comment, 26 LA. L. REv. 666 (1966).
56. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1947).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Lassoff, 147 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ky. 1957).
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tend to be reliable. The "reasonable man" standard does not
prohibit the magistrate from drawing expert inferences based
on his own experiences and training.5 8
The ultimate question considered by the magistrate is whether
the inferences from the facts are sufficiently probable to merit
the issuance of a warrant. Thus, "probable cause sufficient for
the issuance of a search warrant deals with probabilities,"5 9 or,
more properly, a judgment of credibility.60 The degree of con-
fidence which a magistrate must have in the truth of the infer-
ences has been discussed by the Supreme Court, but has not been
set forth in terms of a formula.
The inferences must be more credible than mere,61 bare,62
or even reasoned suspicion.63 This suggests that the magistrate
must discriminate between possibility-plus-imagination and prob-
ability. The standard of certainty for the issuance of search
warrants is not as great as that which would justify conviction
or even indictment. 4 Therefore, the applicant need not satisfy
the magistrate beyond a reasonable doubt,"5 nor even make a
prima facie case for the search. The nearest the Supreme Court
has come to formulating a positive test for the degree of con-
fidence that the issuant must have is "a reasonable belief"" or
a "reasonably trustworthy belief. '6 7 The use of "reasonable" in
this instance, however, probably means no more than that the
iisuing officers are given a great deal of discretion.
II. LOUISIANA
Article I, section 7, of the Louisiana Constitution provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be, violated, and no such search or seizure
shall be made except upon warrant therefor issued upon
58. See, e.g., Irby v. United States, 246 F.2d 706 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Conti v.
Morgenthau, 232 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
59. United States v. Plemmons, 336 F.2d 731, 733 (6th Cir. 1964).
60. See Ayer, Chance, in SCIENnF o AMERICAN 44 (Oct. 1965).
61. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
62. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
63. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1960).
64. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 348 (1813).
65. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959); Marderosian v.
United States, 337 F.2d 759 (1st Cir. 1964).
66. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1924).
67. 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
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probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized." (Emphasis added.)
Although this provision continues the division found in the
fourth amendment, 8 there is a clear incorporation of the war-
rant clause in the reasonable clause. Thus, a literal interpreta-
tion of the Louisiana Constitution would preclude any search
and seizure -not under warrant. Nevertheless, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court treats section 7 of article I as if it were the
equivalent of the fourth amendment. 9
The Louisiana statutory provisions relating to the issuance
of search warrants are found throughout the Revised Statutes. °
These statutes conform to the pattern established by Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(a), (b), (c) and (d). But a
significant difference in the Louisiana Statutes is that Louisi-
ana does not require "positive" information on which to ground
probable cause for a night search or seizure.7 1 The Louisiana
Law Institute has drafted a proposed revision of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure and its title on search warrants is
modeled on rule 41; but it continues the current rule on night
searches and provides for the seizure of "mere evidence. '7 2
Ker v. California erased any doubts as to the applicability
of the fourth amendment to the states.73 The Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Clark in Mapp v. Ohio, appeared to
base the exclusionary rule on a freedom complementary to,
though not dependent upon, the fourth amendment. The Court
68. See p. 802 supra.
69. State v. Ajas, 243 La. 945, 961, 149 So. 2d 400, 405 (1963). A literal
interpretation would require the court to void LA. R.S. 15:60 (1950), which
allows police officers to arrest without obtaining a warrant in some circum-
stances.
70. LA. R.S. 15:42-44, 26:713, 34:875, 40:972, 40:1570, 47:860, 56:108
(1950).
71. Orfield, Searches and Seizures in Federal Criminal Cases, 24 LA. L. REV.
665, 702 (1964).
72. LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE, PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Search Warrants, ;tit. IV, art. 161 (1966). Although the
subject of "mere evidence" is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted
that the prohibition against its seizure traces back to Entick v. Carrington, 19
HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 1029 (1765). See also Abel v. United States, 362 U.S.
217 (1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
There is an exception to this rule where the search and seizure are incidental
to lawful arrest. See United States v. Alvarado, 321 F.2d 336 (2d Cir. 1963)
United States v. Mishkin, 317 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1963).
73. 367 U.S. 643 (1960).
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in Ker, with Justice Clark once more delivering the opinion, held
that searches and seizures by state officials must conform to
"the 'fundamental criteria' laid down by the fourth amendment
and in the opinions of this Court applying that Amendment.
74
The difficulties facing the states in attempting to comply with
this decision are illustrated by the failure of the members of
the Court to agree as to the effect of applying the fourth amend-
ment to the facts of Ker. After laying to rest the idea that the
Mapp exclusionary rule might enforce a standard less stringent
than the fourth amendment, Justice Clark threw doubt on the
applicability of all federal search and seizure jurisprudence to
the states. He suggested that the states remain free to formu-
late rules for the practical administration of criminal justice
and that existing state laws were not abolished. 75 It is submit-
ted that this apparent invitation to stray from the federal juris-
prudence does not apply to the cause requirement necessary to
support a search. While some of the concepts evolved from the
federal cases are, in the words of Justice Traynor, "turbid with
the wash of the fourth amendment itself, of statutes specifying
the authority of federal officers . . . [and] of the Supreme
Court's monitorship," 76 the standards of cause set forth in the
federal .cases will probably be held to be constitutionally com-
pelled. Statutes authorizing federal officers to search track the
language in the fourth amendment and there is no indication
that the courts are giving the statutory language a different
interpretation. 77 There is also no hint that the federal courts
have relied on their supervisory powers to formulate a more
exacting standard for cause to search than is required by the
Constitution.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana has announced the neces-
sity of strict compliance with the Mapp rule. 78 The United
States Supreme Court has reversed and remanded two of the
eleven post-Mapp Louisiana cases dealing with probable cause
74. 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1962).
75. Id. at 31.
76. 63B Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKF, L.J.
319, 329.
77. Cf. Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885) ; Gold-Washing &
Water Co. v. Keys, 96 US. 199 (1.877) ; Osborn v. Bank of the United States,
22 U.S. 738 (1824).
78. The only post-Mapp decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court which or-
dered evidence suppressed is State v. Lee, 247 La. 553, 172 So. 2d 678 (1965).
The suppression was based on a defect in the warrant.
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or reasonableness. 7 9 In State v. McIlvaine0 the Louisiana court
refused to invalidate a warrant based upon "information from
a reliable source that there [were] narcotics and burglary tools
concealed in the premises" to be searched. The United States
Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case8 '
for further consideration in light of Aguilar v. Texas. On re-
mand,8 2 Aguilar was summarized by the Louisiana Court as re-
quiring that the magistrate be informed of some of the under-
lying circumstances "from which the officer concluded that the
informant . . . was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.'"
(Emphasis added.) The use of the disjunctive in linking the
elements of the Aguilar test appears to be improper as the
magistrate must judge the credibility of the informer and the
reliability of the information he provides.
The Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Pickens, 3 found
that a warrantless search was reasonable where strangers in a
small community were driving at a low rate of speed and "look-
ing up" an alley adjacent to the scene of a burglary.8 4 The Court
ultimately based its ruling on the grounds that the search was
incidental to a lawful arrest,85 but it would seem that there was
nothing on which to base a lawful arrest until after the search
revealed stolen goods. It is submitted that Pickens must rest on
the "moving vehicle" rule if it is to meet the federal standard.
As has been stated, the "moving vehicle" rule does not entitle
the investigating officers to base their searches on inferences
which would be too tenuous to support a warrant. The rule only
allows the officers to make a search without a warrant when
79. One of the cases, James v. Louisiana, 382 U.S. 36 (1965), concerns cause
to arrest and the scope of search incidental to arrest.
80. 245 La. 649, 160 So. 2d 566 (1964).
81. 379 U.S. 10 (1964).
82. 247 La. 747, 174 So. 2d 515 (1965). The conviction was again affirmed
on the theory that the search was incidental to a lawful arrest.-
83. 245 La. 680, 160 So. 2d 577 (1964).
84. Furtive gestures, though generally subject to innocent interpretations,
may be relevant in establishing'reasonable grounds to search or seize; but alone
are not sufficient. See Lane v. United States, 321 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1963) ;
Paris v. United States, 321 F.2d 378 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Espinoza v. United States,
278 F.2d 802 (5th Cir. 1960). See also Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
103 (1959). Where furtive behavior is induced by improper police conduct it
will not be considered. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)
Miller v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
85. In so holding, the Court apparently committed Louisiana to a broad
definition of arrest, for the search in question followed the stopping of the auto-
mobile 'but preceded the policeman's statement of arrest. This may preclude
any attempt to avoid Escobedo-related problems by narrowing the concept of
arrest.
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they could have obtained one had a magistrate been available.
Although a magistrate might have given weight to the "radar"
which experienced policemen acquire, the inferences relied on
in Pickens seem closer to suspicion than probable cause.
On facts similar to Draper v. United States,M the Louisiana
court in State v. Oliver 7 upheld a warrant to search the persons
of two suspected narcotics possessors. There can be no doubt,
in the light of the United States Supreme Court's finding of
cause to arrest in Draper, that there was cause to search in
Oliver. This case is noteworthy in that it seems to support the
proposition that the search of a person is not an arrest nor does
it require an arrest. As it is likely that more cause must be
shown to arrest than to search, the implication of Oliver may
be of significance to law enforcement officers,
The Louisiana Supreme Court is understandably reluctant
to free criminals by suppressing relevant evidence. As a result
the Court has examined questionable searches for an element
of consent which would remove the police activity from the
operation of the fourth amendment. Consent must be freely and
intelligently given to be effective.18 Intelligently in this sense
means awareness of the possible consequences and not merely
knowledge of the incriminating evidence which might be exposed.
Because it seems unlikely that a guilty person would intelligently
consent to a search, the federal courts view consent with a
"jaundiced eye."89 In State v. Pennington" the Louisiana Court
found that the defendant had consented to a search subsequent
to a demand by the police that they be allowed to inspect certain
goods. The federal courts might well have reached the same
decision because the defendant was a former police officer and
was not likely to be intimidated or confused by the presence of
officers.
In State v. Rowan91 the court, combining the concepts of con-
sent and abandonment, found that there was no violation of
the fourth amendment. Rowan was arrested "on suspicion" of
burglary and failure to possess a selective service card. During
86. 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
87. 247 La. 729, 174 So. 2d 509 (1965) ; see Comment, 26 LA. L. REV. 789, 797(1966).
88. State v. Turner, 177 So. 2d 115, 117 (La. 1965).
89. See, e.g., Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
90. 244 La. 650, 153 So. 2d 876 (1963).
91. 246 La. 24, 163 So. 2d 87 (1964).
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the course of his interrogation he stated that he owned a Stude-
baker automobile. A police officer searched for the automobile
for six or seven hours and found a Studebaker parked in a com-
mercial area of the city. The officer "saw no one around to
whom the vehicle might belong" and after searching the glove
compartment drove it to the police station. A detailed search
of the interior disclosed a pistol under the front seat which was
subsequently used as evidence in a burglary prosecution. The
court found that the evidence was properly admitted, for the
search which revealed it was performed in a routine manner as
would have been done in any case involving an abandoned auto-
mobile. This decision either rests on the premise that Rowan had
abandoned the vehicle in such a manner that it was no longer
one of his "effects" within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment, or that there is an implied consent by automobile owners
to allow their cars to be searched when they are left in "de-
serted" areas after dark.
CONCLUSION
Justice Black, commenting on the cases developing the exclu-
sionary rule, has written: "In no other field has the law's uncer-
tainty been more clearly manifested. ' 92 Some of the uncertainty
may be the product of inconsistent cases, but much more is in-
herent in the subject matter. The decision of whether to search
is so closely tied to the facts of each case that the applicable
law is too general to function without a large element of discre-
tion. The belief that it is wiser for this discretion to be wielded
by judicial officers than police is responsible for the warrant
provisions of the fourth amendment. A few rules have evolved
which rigorously define the power to search and seize. Gen-
erally, however, the courts have been content to guide the legis-
lators by articulating constitutional policy, rather than by defin-
ing the permissible limits of discretion with absolutes. It is sub-
mitted that a logical application of the policies to a given case
involves a consideration of each of the following elements sepa-
rately: (1) the value of the interest invaded by the search, (2)
the nature of the fazts relied upon by the searcher or issuant,
(3) the inferences which can be drawn from the properly con-
sidered facts, (4) the strength of the inferences, and (5) the
circumstances surrounding the search.
Edwin K. Hunter
92. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 67 (1950) (dissent).
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